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1 Introduction
Conditions for the existence of monotone selections are a fascinating topic
from a purely mathematical viewpoint. It is also important for economic
theory, especially, game theory.
To derive the existence of a Nash equilibrium from Tarski’s (1955) fixed
point theorem, or its immediate generalization by Abian and Brown (1961),
we need monotone selections from the best response correspondences. (In
contrast, Kakutani’s theorem, while being a generalization of Brouwer’s, is
usually applied in the absence of continuous selections.) Admittedly, there
are fixed point theorems for increasing correspondences without monotone
selections, see e.g., Lemma 2.8 of Roddy and Schro¨der (2005), but so far
they have found no application in game theory. When it comes to decreasing
best responses (or monotonicity in a more elaborate sense), every equilib-
rium existence result in the literature hinges on the availability of monotone
(in an appropriate sense) selections (McManus, 1962, 1964; Novshek, 1985;
Kukushkin, 1994, 2000, 2004, 2007; Dubey et al., 2006).
The “standard” theory of games with strategic complementarities as de-
veloped in Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Mil-
grom and Shannon (1994), and summarized in Topkis (1998), imposes as-
sumptions ensuring that the best responses to any profile of other players’
strategies form a complete sublattice of the player’s strategy set, hence the
maximal, or minimal, best response provides a selection needed.
Those assumptions hold in a wide variety of important situations. How-
ever, if, in the spirit of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), one asks whether they
are, indeed, indispensable for the best responses to exist and be increas-
ing, the answer will be an unequivocal “No.” Smith’s (1974) Theorems 4.1
and 4.2 show a clear difference between the two properties of a preference
ordering – “to attain a maximum on every compact subset” and “to have a
nonempty, closed set of maximizers on every compact subset”; the difference
does not disappear when an order structure replaces, or is added to, topol-
ogy. Similarly, quasisupermodularity is necessary for monotone comparative
statics (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Theorem 4), but not for increasing
best responses when a strategy set is fixed; and if the preferences are not
quasisupermodular, the set of best responses need not be a sublattice.
It even happens that no assumption ensuring the existence of the best
responses can be justified. Although a Nash equilibrium may still exist (Das-
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gupta and Maskin, 1986; Reny, 1999), a more robust approach is to consider
ε-best responses and ε-equilibrium. Moreover, preferences described by, say,
interval orders may be suggested for their own sake rather than for technical
convenience: it is sometimes argued that the “complete rationality” of the
players’ preferences is unrealistic.
Monotone selections from the best, or ε-best, response correspondences
would be of much help in every situation described above. To the best of
my knowledge, there is no result in the previous literature wherefrom their
existence could be derived. This paper strives to fill in this lacuna although
some interesting questions remain open.
There is another motive, not closely related to the existence of Nash equi-
libria. The Appendix to Milgrom and Shannon (1994) contains an “almost
topology-free” sufficient condition for a utility function on a complete lattice
to attain its maximum. Unfortunately, their proof relies on “Theorem A2,”
ascribed to A.F.Veinott, which is actually wrong. The replacement of the
references to “Theorem A2” with those to Theorem 1 of this paper saves the
proof, hence that remarkable result no longer hangs in the air.
Section 2 reproduces some standard notions. In Section 3, we consider
correspondences increasing w.r.t. extensions of the basic order to subsets. In
Theorem 1, it is the “weak Veinott order,” which need not even be transitive;
in Theorem 2, the usual Veinott order. For the existence of a monotone
selection we have to assume that each value is chain-complete in Theorem 1,
and that the target is a sublattice of the Cartesian product of a finite number
of chains in Theorem 2.
In Section 4, the correspondence is generated by the maximization of
a binary relation on a chain; the relation depends on a parameter from a
partially ordered set, and the single crossing condition holds. Theorem 3
shows the existence of a monotone selection if the preference relation is always
a strongly acyclic interval order and the set of parameters is a chain. If the
relation is only strongly acyclic and transitive, there may be no monotone
selection, but Theorem 4 shows that a Nash equilibrium exists anyway. The
main proofs are deferred to Section 5; concluding remarks are collected in
Section 6.
3
2 Preliminaries
Notions such as a partially ordered set (a poset), a chain, and a (complete)
lattice are assumed commonly known. We denoteBX the set of all nonempty
subsets of a given set X. A poset X is called chain-complete if supY and
inf Y exist in X for every chain Y ∈ BX . If X is a chain-complete poset
and Y ∈ BX , we call Y chain-complete in X if supZ ∈ Y and inf Z ∈ Y for
every chain Z ∈ BY .
A correspondence from S to X is a mapping R : S → BX ; a mapping
r : S → X is a selection from R if r(s) ∈ R(s) for all s ∈ S. If S and X are
posets, a mapping r : S → X is increasing if r(s′) ≥ r(s) whenever s′ > s; r
is decreasing if r(s′) ≤ r(s) whenever s′ > s. A monotone selection from a
correspondence R : S → BX is a selection from R which is increasing. Since
the reversal of the order on S (or, equivalently, on X) makes an increasing
mapping decreasing and vice versa, there is no need for a separate study of
“anti-monotone” selections.
The framework of the “naive” set theory with the unrestricted Axiom of
Choice is adopted throughout. In practice, we invoke either Zorn’s Lemma
(if a poset contains an upper bound for every nonempty subchain, then it
contains an undominated point) or Zermelo’s Theorem (every set can be
well-ordered).
3 Increasing correspondences
We start with a few ways to extend an order given on X to BX . Let X be
a poset and Y, Z ∈ BX . The following relations are, at least, transitive:
Y ≥Inf Z ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀z ∈ Z ∃z′ ∈ Z [y ≥ z′ & z ≥ z′]; (1a)
Y ≥Sup Z ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀z ∈ Z ∃y′ ∈ Y [y′ ≥ z & y′ ≥ y]. (1b)
When X is a lattice, Veinott’s order (Topkis, 1998) seems most popular.
We define it as a conjunction of the “lower and upper halves,” and also define
a weak version:
Y ≥∧ Z ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀z ∈ Z [y ∧ z ∈ Z]; (1c)
Y ≥∨ Z ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀z ∈ Z [y ∨ z ∈ Y ]; (1d)
4
Y ≥Vt Z ­ [Y ≥∧ Z & Y ≥∨ Z]; (1e)
Y ≥wV Z ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀z ∈ Z [y ∨ z ∈ Y or y ∧ z ∈ Z]. (1f)
The relation ≥Vt is antisymmetric and transitive on BX ; it is reflexive on
sublattices. Neither ≥wV, nor ≥∧ or ≥∨ need even be transitive.
Let ≥∗ denote one of the relations (1) and S be a poset. We say that a
correspondences R : S → BX is increasing w.r.t. ≥∗ if R(s′) ≥∗ R(s) whenever
s′ > s. Note that we do not require ≥∗ to be reflexive on R(s). In particular,
an ascending (Topkis, 1998) correspondence is increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt, but the
converse need not hold.
The best-known results on the existence of monotone selections (Top-
kis, 1998) are applicable to ascending correspondences to complete lattices.
Similar results hold under monotonicity in a weaker sense.
Proposition 3.1. A correspondence R from a poset S to a poset X admits
a monotone selection if it is increasing w.r.t. ≥Inf and every R(s) (s ∈ S) is
chain-complete.
Proof. For every s ∈ S, we denote R−(s) := {x ∈ R(s) | @y ∈ R(s) [y <
x]}. Since R(s) is chain-complete, Zorn’s Lemma immediately implies that
R−(s) 6= ∅. Then we pick r(s) ∈ R−(s) for every s ∈ S arbitrarily. If s′ > s,
then, by (1a), there is x ∈ R(s) such that x ≤ r(s) and x ≤ r(s′). Since
r(s) ∈ R−(s), we must have x = r(s).
Dually, the existence of a monotone selection follows from monotonic-
ity w.r.t. ≥Sup and chain-completeness of every R(s). Without the chain-
completeness of R(s), Proposition 3.1 is wrong.
Example 3.2. Let X := [0, 1] and R : X → BX be this: R(0) :=]0, 1];
R(x) := {x/2} for x > 0. Clearly, R is increasing even w.r.t. ≥∧, but it
admits neither monotone selection, nor fixed point.
The example shows that Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994) “Theorem A2” is
also wrong. It only becomes valid if the chain-completeness of R(s) is added
to the conditions.
Theorem 1. Let X be a lattice, S be a poset, R : S → BX be increasing
w.r.t. ≥wV, and every R(s) (s ∈ S) be chain-complete. Then there exists a
monotone selection from R.
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The proof is deferred to Section 5.1. Referring to this result instead of
“Theorem A2,” we obtain a correct proof of Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994)
Theorem A4.
Theorem A4 (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Let X be a complete
lattice; let f : X → R be quasisupermodular and such that for every chain
C ⊆ X, there hold
lim sup
x∈C, x↑supC
f(x) ≤ f(supC) (2a)
and
lim sup
x∈C, x↓inf C
f(x) ≤ f(inf C). (2b)
Then argmaxx∈X f(x) is a nonempty complete sublattice of X.
Remark. The original formulation of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) is about
argmaxx∈S f(x), where S is a complete sublattice of X; however, this exten-
sion is straightforward because all assumptions about f are inherited by its
restriction to S.
Proof. We consider the mapping R : f(X) → BX defined by R(a) := {x ∈
X | f(x) ≥ a}. Conditions (2) ensure that every R(a) is chain-complete in
X. If x ∈ R(a) and y ∈ R(b), but y ∧ x /∈ R(a), then f(x) > f(y ∧ x),
hence f(y∨x) > f(y) by the quasisupermodularity of f , hence y∨x ∈ R(b);
therefore, R(b) ≥wV R(a). We see that R is increasing w.r.t. ≥wV, whatever
order is chosen on f(X) (this funny thing is possible because ≥wV is not an
order). Let us consider the order on f(X) induced from R; by Theorem 1,
there exists a monotone selection r from R. Clearly, C := {r(a)}a∈f(X) is a
chain in X; denoting x∗ := supC, we have f(x∗) ≥ f(x) for every x ∈ X
by (2a), i.e., x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈X f(x) 6= ∅. Now, the quasisupermodularity
of f ensures, in a standard way, that argmaxx∈X f(x) is a sublattice of X;
conditions (2), that it is chain-complete in X. Therefore, it is a complete
sublattice of X.
Without topological restrictions on values R(s), the existence of a mono-
tone selection can be obtained either for a weakly ascending correspondence
from a finite poset, or for an ascending correspondence.
Proposition 3.3. Let X be a lattice, S be a finite poset, and R : S → BX
be increasing w.r.t. ≥wV. Then there exists a monotone selection from R.
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Theorem 2. Let X be a sublattice of the Cartesian product of a finite number
of chains. Let S be a poset and R : S → BX be increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt. Then
there exists a monotone selection from R.
The proofs are deferred to Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively.
4 ε-Best responses
In this section, we study correspondences generated by the maximization of a
binary relation. Formally, we consider a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of binary
relations on X; the parameter s may be interpreted as (an aggregate of) the
choice(s) of other agent(s). We define
R(s) := {x ∈ X | @ y ∈ X [y Âs x]}. (3)
A relation Â is strongly acyclic if there exists no infinite improvement
path, i.e., no sequence 〈xk〉k∈N such that xk+1 Â xk for all k. A relation Â is
an interval order if it is irreflexive and transitive, and satisfies the condition
∀x, y, a, b ∈ X [ [y Â x & b Â a]⇒ [y Â a or b Â x] ]. (4)
The importance of those properties of preference relations is shown by these
straightforward characterization results.
Proposition 4.1. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X. For every Y ⊆ X,
we denote M(Y ) := {x ∈ Y | @ y ∈ Y [y Â x]}. Then these two statements
are equivalent.
1. Â is strongly acyclic and transitive.
2. Whenever Y ⊆ X and x ∈ Y \M(Y ), there is y ∈ M(Y ) such that
y Â x.
Proposition 4.2. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X, and M(Y ), for
every Y ⊆ X, be the same as in Proposition 4.1. Then these two statements
are equivalent.
1. Â is a strongly acyclic interval order.
2. Whenever Y ⊆ X and {x0, . . . , xk} ⊆ Y \M(Y ), there is y ∈ M(Y )
such that y Â xm for each m = 0, . . . , k.
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Routine proofs are omitted.
A parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S possesses the single crossing property if these
conditions hold:
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ > s & y Âs x & y > x]⇒ y Âs′ x]; (5a)
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ > s & y Âs′ x & y < x]⇒ y Âs x]. (5b)
As Alexei Savvateev (a seminar presentation, 2007) observed, the conditions
(equivalent to Milgrom and Shannon’s when every Âs is an ordering rep-
resented by a numeric function) can be perceived as monotonicity w.r.t. a
partial order on the set of binary relations on X.
Theorem 3. Let X and S be chains such that both minS and maxS exist.
Let a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of binary relations on X satisfy both condi-
tions (5). Let every Âs be a strongly acyclic interval order. Then there exists
a monotone selection from R.
Remark. The restriction on S is obviously satisfied if it is complete,
The proof is deferred to Section 5.4. As an example, let u : X × S → R
be bounded above and ε > 0; let the preference relation be
y Âs x­ u(y, s) > u(x, s) + ε.
It is easily seen that every Âs is a strongly acyclic interval order (actually,
a semiorder). R(s) consists of all ε-maxima of u(·, s). Both conditions (5)
hold if u satisfies Topkis’s (1979) increasing differences condition:
[s′ > s & y > x]⇒ u(y, s′)− u(x, s′) ≥ u(y, s)− u(x, s);
in this context, the property is equivalent to the supermodularity of u (as
a function on the lattice X × S). Neither Theorem 1, nor Theorem 2 are
applicable here: R is increasing w.r.t. ≥wV, but not necessarily w.r.t. ≥Vt;
R(s) need not be complete (i.e., compact).
The assumption in Theorem 3 that the preferences are described by in-
terval orders cannot just be dropped, even for finite sets X and S.
Example 4.3. Let X := {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, S := {0, 1} (both with natural or-
ders), and relations Âs be defined by: 2 Â0 4 Â0 0 Â0 1 Â0 3; 1 Â1 3 Â1
2 Â1 4 Â1 0. Clearly, R(0) = {2} while R(1) = {1}, so there is no mono-
tone selection. On the other hand, conditions (5) are easy to check: (5a) is
nontrivial only for 4 Â0 0; (5b), only for 1 Â1 3 and 2 Â1 4.
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Under the assumption that every Âs is strongly acyclic and transitive,
Theorem 3 is valid for finite X or S, but not generally.
Example 4.4. Let X := [−2, 2], S := [−1, 1] (both with natural orders),
and relations Âs be defined by
y Âs x­ [u1(y, s) > u1(x, s) & u2(y, s) > u2(x, s)], (6)
where u : X × S → R2 is this: u(1, s) := 〈5, 2〉 and u(−1, s) := 〈2, 5〉 for all
s ∈ S; u(2, s) := u(−2, s) := u(x, s) := 〈0, 0〉 for all x ∈] − 1, 1[ and s ∈ S;
whenever x ∈]1, 2[ and s ≥ 0,
u1(x, s) :=
{
x+ s− 1, if x+ s ≤ 2,
x+ s+ 4, if x+ s > 2,
while u2(x, s) := 6− x− s;
whenever x ∈]− 2,−1[ and s ≥ 0, u(x, s) := 〈6 + x,−1− x〉; finally, ui(x, s)
for s < 0, i = 1, 2, and x ∈]− 2,−1[∪]1, 2[ is such that the equality
ui(x, s) = u3−i(−x,−s) (7)
holds for all s ∈ S, i = 1, 2, and x ∈ X.
The very form of (6) ensures that every Âs is irreflexive and transitive.
Whenever x ∈ {−2}∪]−1, 1[∪{2} and y ∈]− 2,−1] ∪ [1, 2[, y Âs x for every
s ∈ S. Whenever x, y ∈]− 2,−1[ or x, y ∈]1, 2[, y Âs x does not hold for any
s ∈ S. Let s ≥ 0; if −2 < x < −1, then u1(x) < 5 and u2(x) ≤ 1, hence
1 Âs x; if 1 < x ≤ 2− s < 2, then u1(x) ≤ 1 and u2(x) < 5, hence −1 Âs x;
if 2 − s < y < 2, then u1(y) > 6 and u2(y) > 3, hence y Âs 1. “Dually,” by
(7), y Âs −1 Âs x whenever s < 0, −2 < y < −2− s, and 1 < x < 2; 1 Âs x
whenever s < 0 and −2−s ≤ x < −1. Thus, we see that every relation Âs is
strongly acyclic: no more than three consecutive improvements can be made
from any starting point (e.g., 2 − s/2 Âs 1 Âs −1.5 Âs −2 when s > 0).
Conditions (5) are easy to check.
It is also easily checked that R(0) = {−1, 1}, R(s) =]−2,−2− s[∪{1} for
s < 0, and R(s) = {−1}∪]2 − s, 2[ for s > 0. Suppose there is a monotone
selection r from R. If r(s) > −1 for some s > 0, then 2 > r(s) > 2 − s;
defining s′ := 2 − r(s) > 0, we have s′ < s, hence r(s′) ≤ r(s), hence
r(s′) < 2 − s′, hence r(s′) ∈ R(s′) is only possible if r(s′) = −1. Therefore,
r(s) = −1 for some s > 0; dually, r(s) = 1 for some s < 0. We have
a contradiction, i.e., there is no monotone selection: Theorem 3 cannot be
extended to strongly acyclic and transitive preference relations.
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The point of Examples 4.3 and 4.4 is that one cannot expect a strong
connection between the single crossing property (5) and behavior of “best”
responses without Statement 2 of Proposition 4.2 or, at least, of Proposi-
tion 4.1.
Let us consider a modification of the standard notion of a strategic game.
There is a finite set N of players and a poset Xi of strategies for each i ∈ N .
We denote XN :=
∏
i∈N Xi and X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj; both are posets with the
Cartesian product of the orders on components. Each player i’s preferences
are described by a parametric family of binary relations Âx−ii on Xi; the
player’s “best” response correspondence Ri is defined by (3) with S := X−i.
A Nash equilibrium is xN ∈ XN such that xi ∈ Ri(x−i) for each i ∈ N .
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a strategic game where each Xi is a complete chain.
Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both
conditions (5). Let every relation Âx−ii be strongly acyclic and transitive.
Then Γ possesses a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is deferred to Section 5.5. Example 4.4 shows that the assump-
tions of the theorem do not ensure the existence of monotone selections from
the “best” response correspondences.
5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we denote R−(s) := {x ∈ R(s) |
@y ∈ R(s) [y < x]} for every s ∈ S, and again obtain R−(s) 6= ∅. We define
R as the set of mappings F : S → BX such that:
∀s ∈ S [R−(s) ⊆ F (s) ⊆ R(s)]; (8a)
∀s ∈ S ∀y, x ∈ R(s) [y > x & y ∈ F (s)⇒ x ∈ F (s)]; (8b)
∀s ∈ S [F (s) is chain-complete in R(s)]; (8c)
F is increasing w.r.t. ≥wV . (8d)
We define F¯ : S → BX by
F¯ (s) :=
⋂
F∈R
F (s) (9)
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for every s ∈ S.
Lemma 5.1.1. F¯ ∈ R.
Proof. Conditions (8a), (8b), and (8c) are satisfied trivially; only (8d) de-
serves some attention. Let s′ > s, y ∈ F¯ (s′), and x ∈ F¯ (s); then y ∈ F (s′)
and x ∈ F (s) for every F ∈ R. If y ∧ x ∈ R(s), then y ∧ x ∈ F (s) for every
F ∈ R by (8b) for F , hence y ∧ x ∈ F¯ (s). Otherwise, y ∨ x ∈ F (s′) for every
F ∈ R by (8d) for F , hence y ∨ x ∈ F¯ (s′). Since y and x were arbitrary,
F¯ (s′) ≥wV F¯ (s), hence F¯ ∈ R indeed.
For any F ∈ R and s ∈ S, we denote F+(s) := {x ∈ F (s) | @y ∈
F (s) [y > x]}; since F (s) is chain-complete, we have F+(s) 6= ∅ as usual.
Lemma 5.1.2. If s′ > s, y ∈ F+(s′) and x ∈ R−(s), then y ≥ x.
Proof. Otherwise, we would have y ∨ x > y and y ∧ x < x; therefore, y ∨ x /∈
F (s′) and y ∧ x /∈ R(s), contradicting F (s′) ≥wV F (s).
For any F ∈ R, we define its transformation F τ : S → BX by
F τ (s) := {x ∈ F (s) | ∀s′ > s ∀y ∈ F+(s′) [y ≥ x]}. (10)
Lemma 5.1.3. For every F ∈ R, there holds F τ ∈ R.
Proof. Condition (8a) immediately follows from Lemma 5.1.2 and (10); (8b)
is obvious. To check (8c), we consider a chain Z ⊆ F τ (s); we have to show
that both inf Z ∈ F τ (s) and supZ ∈ F τ (s). The former immediately follows
from (8b). Suppose x := supZ /∈ F τ (s), i.e., there are s′ > s and y ∈ F+(s′)
such that y  x; then we have x > y ∧ x. On the other hand, y ∧ x ∈ F (s)
because F (s′) ≥wV F (s) and y ∈ F+(s′); for every z ∈ Z, we have x ≥ z by
the definition of x and y ≥ z because z ∈ F τ (s), hence y ∧ x ≥ z as well.
Clearly, we have a contradiction with the definition of x.
Finally, let us check (8d); let s′ > s, y ∈ F τ (s′), and x ∈ F τ (s). If
y ∧ x ∈ F (s), then y ∧ x ∈ F τ (s) by (8b) for F τ . Otherwise, y ∨ x ∈ F (s′).
For every s′′ > s and z ∈ F+(s′′), we have z ≥ x because x ∈ F τ (s), and
z ≥ y because y ∈ F τ (s′). Therefore, z ≥ y ∨ x; since z was arbitrary,
y ∨ x ∈ F τ (s′).
Lemma 5.1.4. F¯ = F¯ τ .
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Immediately follows from (9), (10), and Lemmas 5.1.3.
Finally, let r : S → X be an arbitrary selection from F¯+. Lemma 5.1.4
and (10) immediately imply that r is increasing.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
We denote S+ := {s ∈ S | @s′ ∈ S [s′ > s]}; for every s ∈ S, we denote
S↓(s) := {s′ ∈ S | s′ < s}; for every s ∈ S and x∗ ∈ X, R(s; x∗) := {x ∈
R(s) | x ≤ x∗}.
Lemma 5.2.1. For every s∗ ∈ S+, there exists x∗ ∈ R(s∗) such that
R(s; x∗) 6= ∅ for every s ∈ S↓(s∗).
Proof. For every x ∈ R(s∗), we denote Z+(x) := {s ∈ S↓(s∗) | R(s;x∗) 6= ∅}
and Z−(x) := S− \ Z+(x). Then we pick x0 ∈ R(s∗) arbitrarily and define
a sequence x0, x1, . . . by recursion. Let xk ∈ R(s∗) have been defined; if
Z+(xk) = S↓(s∗), we take xk as x∗ and finish the process. Otherwise, we
pick s ∈ Z−(xk) arbitrarily; we have R(s∗) ≥wV R(s). Picking x ∈ R(s)
arbitrarily, we apply (1f) with y = xk. Since R(s;xk) = ∅, we have x ∧ xk /∈
R(s), hence x ∨ xk ∈ R(s∗). Defining xk+1 := x ∨ xk > xk, we obtain
Z+(xk) ⊂ Z+(xk+1). Since S is finite, the sequence must stabilize at some
stage, i.e., reach the situation Z+(xk) = S↓(s∗).
Now the proposition is proven with straightforward induction in #S.
Picking s∗ ∈ S+ arbitrarily and x∗ as in Lemma 5.2.1, we define R¯ : S\{s∗} →
X by R¯(s) := R(s;x∗) for s ∈ S↓(s∗) and R¯(s) := R(s) otherwise. Obviously,
R¯(s) is increasing w.r.t. ≥wV, hence it admits a monotone selection r by the
induction hypothesis. Adding r(s∗) := x∗, we obtain a monotone selection
from R on S.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 2
LetX ⊆∏m∈M Cm, where each Cm is a chain. We assumeM totally ordered,
say, M = {0, 1, . . . , m¯}; then, invoking Zermelo’s Theorem, we assume each
Cm well ordered with an orderÀm (generally, having nothing to do with the
basic order on Cm). Given y 6= x, we define D(y, x) := {m ∈M | ym 6= xm},
d := minD(y, x), and y À x­ yd Àd xd;
Lemma 5.3.1. X is well ordered by À.
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Proof. Being a lexicographic combination, À is clearly an order. For every
Y ∈ BX , we define c1 := min{y1 | y ∈ Y }, c2 := min{y2 | y ∈ Y & y1 = c1},
etc. (the minima are w.r.t. À1, À2, etc.); then (c1, c2, . . . , cm¯) is the least in
Y w.r.t. À.
Lemma 5.3.2. Let x, y ∈ X and y  x. Then xÀ y ∧ x ⇐⇒ y ∨ xÀ y.
Proof. Denoting D− := {m ∈ M | ym < xm}, we immediately see that
D− = D(y, y ∨ x) = D(x, y ∧ x); let d := minD−. If xd Àd yd, then
xÀ y ∧ x and y ∨ xÀ y. If yd Àd xd, then y À y ∨ x and y ∧ xÀ x.
Remark. We might say that À is “quasimodular.”
Now we define r(s) := minR(s) (w.r.t. À); it exists and is unique. r
is a selection from R by definition; let us show it is increasing. Let s′ > s,
y = r(s′) and x = r(s); since R is increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt, we have y ∧ x ∈ R(s)
and y ∨ x ∈ R(s′). If y  x, then x 6= y ∧ x and y 6= y ∨ x, hence y ∧ xÀ x
and y ∨ x À y by the definition of r. Thus, we have a contradiction with
Lemma 5.3.2.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 3
We call a subset S ′ ⊆ S an interval if s ∈ S ′ whenever s′ < s < s′′ and
s′, s′′ ∈ S ′. The intersection of any number of intervals is an interval too.
Till the end of the proof, we denote [s′, s′′] the least interval containing both
s′ and s′′ (thus [s′, s′′] = [s′′, s′]).
Lemma 5.4.1. For every x ∈ X, the set {s ∈ S | x ∈ R(s)} is an interval.
Proof. Suppose the contrary: s′ < s < s′′ and x ∈ R(s′) ∩ R(s′′), but x /∈
R(s). By Proposition 4.1, we can pick x∗ ∈ R(s) such that x∗ Âs x. If
x∗ > x, we have x∗ Âs′′ x by (5a), contradicting the assumed x ∈ R(s′′). If
x∗ < x, we have x∗ Âs′ x by (5b) with the same contradiction.
The key role is played by the following recursive definition of sequences
xk ∈ X, sk ∈ S, and Sk ⊆ S (k ∈ N) such that:
sk ∈ Sk; (11a)
Sk is an interval; (11b)
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∀s ∈ Sk [xk ∈ R(s)]; (11c)
∀m < k [Sk ∩ Sm = ∅]; (11d)
∀m < k [[sk < sm ⇒ xk < xm] & [sk > sm ⇒ xk > xm]]; (11e)
∀m < k [xk Âsk xm or xm ∈ R(sk)]; (11f)
∀s ∈ S [[xk ∈ R(s) & s /∈ Sk]⇒ ∃m < k (s ∈ Sm or sm ∈ [s, sk] )]. (11g)
We start with an arbitrary s0 ∈ S, pick x0 ∈ R(s0), and set S0 := {s ∈
S | x0 ∈ R(s)}. Now (11a), (11c), and (11g) for k = 0 immediately follow
from the definitions; (11b), from Lemma 5.4.1; (11d), (11e), and (11f) hold
by default.
Let k ∈ N \ {0}, and let xm, sm, Sm satisfying (11) have been defined for
all m < k. We define S¯k :=
⋃
m<k S
m. For every s ∈ S¯k, there is a unique,
by (11d), µ(s) < k such that s ∈ Sµ(s). By (11c), r(s) := xµ(s) is a selection
from R on S¯k. The conditions (11b) and (11e) imply that r is increasing. If
S¯k = S, then we already have a monotone selection, so we stop the process.
Otherwise, we pick sk ∈ S \ S¯k arbitrarily and denote K− := {m < k |
sm < sk}, K+ := {m < k | sm > sk} K∗ := {m < k | xm /∈ R(sk)},
m− := argmaxm∈K− s
m, m+ := argminm∈K+ s
m, and I := [sm
−
, sm
+
]. If one
of K± is empty (both cannot be), the respective m± is left undefined, in
which case I := {s ∈ S | sm− < s} or I := {s ∈ S | s < sm+}.
By Proposition 4.2, we can pick xk ∈ R(sk) such that xk Âsk xm for each
m ∈ K∗, hence (11f) holds. Finally, we define Sk := {s ∈ S \ S¯k | xk ∈
R(s)} ∩ I. Now the conditions (11a), (11c), and (11d) immediately follow
from the definitions; (11b) and (11g), from Lemma 5.4.1.
Checking (11e) needs a bit more effort. If we assume that xm
− ∈ R(sk),
then the condition (11g) for m− and sk implies the existence of m < m−
such that sm
−
< sm < sk, contradicting the definition of m−; therefore,
xk Âsk xm− by (11f). If xk < xm− then xk Âsm− xm− by (5b), contradicting
(11c) for m−. Therefore, xk > xm
− ≥ xm for all m ∈ K−. A dual argument
shows that xk < xm
+ ≤ xm for all m ∈ K+. Thus, (11e) holds.
To summarize, either we obtain a monotone selection on some step, or
our sequences are defined [and satisfy (11)] for all k ∈ N.
Lemma 5.4.2. If conditions (11) hold for all k ∈ N, then there exists an
increasing sequence 〈kh〉h∈N such that skh is either monotone increasing or
monotone decreasing in h, and xkh+1 Âskh+1 xkh for each h ∈ N.
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Proof. We denote N↓, respectively, N↑, the set of k ∈ N such that sm < sk,
or sm > sk, holds for an infinite number of m ∈ N. Clearly, N = N↓ ∪ N↑;
without restricting generality, N↓ 6= ∅. We consider two alternatives.
Let there exist min{sk | k ∈ N↓} = s∗; then the set {m ∈ N | sm < sk}
is finite for every sk < s∗, hence the set {m ∈ N | sk < sm < s∗} is infinite.
We define k0 := min{k ∈ N | sk < s∗}, and then recursively define kh+1 as
the least k ∈ N for which skh < sk < s∗. The minimality of kh ensures that
kh+1 > kh. Whenever s
kh < sm < skh+1 , we have m > kh+1 by the same
minimality; therefore, xkh /∈ R(skh+1) by (11g), hence xkh+1 Âskh+1 xkh by
(11f).
Let min{sk | k ∈ N↓} not exist; then the set {m ∈ N↓ | sm < sk} is
nonempty (actually, infinite) for every k ∈ N↓. We set k0 := minN↓, and
then recursively define kh+1 as the least k ∈ N↓ for which sk < skh . The
minimality of kh again ensures that kh+1 > kh. Whenever s
kh+1 < sm < skh ,
we have m ∈ N↓, hence m > kh+1; therefore, xkh /∈ R(skh+1) by (11g), hence
xkh+1 Âskh+1 xkh by (11f).
The final step of the proof consists in showing that the existence of a
sequence described in Lemma 5.4.2 contradicts the strong acyclicity assump-
tion. We denote s− := minS and s+ := maxS. If skh is increasing, the
relations xkh+1 Âskh+1 xkh “translate,” by (5a), to xkh+1 Âs+ xkh for each
h ∈ N. If skh is decreasing, we obtain xkh+1 Âs− xkh for each h ∈ N by (5b).
5.5 Proof of Theorem 4
The key role is played by the following recursive definition of a sequence
xkN ∈ XN (k ∈ N) such that xk+1N ≥ xkN and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i) for all k ∈ N
and i ∈ N . By the latter condition, xkN is a Nash equilibrium if xk+1N = xkN .
On the other hand, the sequence must stabilize at some stage because of the
strong acyclicity assumption.
We define x0i := minXi for each i ∈ N . Given xkN , we, for each i ∈
N independently, check whether xki ∈ Ri(xk−i) holds. If it does, we define
xk+1i := x
k
i ; otherwise, we pick x
k+1
i ∈ Ri(xk−i) such that xk+1i Â
xk−i
i x
k
i (it
exists by Proposition 4.1). Supposing xk+1i < x
k
i (hence k > 0), we obtain
xk+1i Â
xk−1−i
i x
k
i by (5b), contradicting the induction hypothesis x
k
i ∈ Ri(xk−1−i ).
Therefore, xk+1i > x
k
i , hence x
k+1
N ≥ xkN .
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Supposing that xk+1N > x
k
N for all k ∈ N, we denote xωi := supk xki for each
i ∈ N ; the completeness of Xi is essential here. Whenever xk+1i 6= xki , we have
xk+1i Â
xk−i
i x
k
i and x
k+1
i > x
k
i as was shown in the previous paragraph; since
xω−i ≥ xk−i, we have xk+1i Â
xω−i
i x
k
i by (5a). Since N is finite, there must be i ∈
N such that xk+1i > x
k
i for an infinite number of k. Clearly, the elimination
of repetitions in the sequence 〈xki 〉k makes it an infinite improvement path
for the relation Âxω−ii , which contradicts the supposed strong acyclicity.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1. We may say that a correspondence R : S → BX admits enough mono-
tone selections if, whenever s ∈ S and x ∈ R(s), there is a monotone selection
r from R such that r(s) = x. It is easily seen from the proofs that a corre-
spondence R satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2 or Theorem 3 admits
enough monotone selections; a similar assertion about Theorem 1 would be
wrong as simple finite examples show.
6.2. It is not necessary in Theorem 1 for R(s) to be chain-complete in X
(and the latter need not be complete anyway). This gain in generality is
hardly needed in any context, but it comes at no cost.
6.3. The function f in Theorem A4 can be replaced with a quasisupermod-
ular preference ordering without any significant change in the proof; only
a straightforward modification of conditions (2) is needed. Actually, both
quasisupermodularity and (2) can be weakened considerably at the price of
a longer proof. A plausible conjecture that a quasisupermodular ordering
on a complete lattice attains its maximum if it attains a maximum on every
complete subchain remains neither proven nor disproved.
6.4. To the best of my knowledge, there is no example of an ascending
correspondence without a monotone selection. However, the current proof
of Theorem 2 is useless even if X is a sublattice of the Cartesian product
of an infinite number of chains, to say nothing of a non-distributive lattice.
Vladimir Danilov (personal communication, 2007) proved the theorem for an
arbitrary lattice X, but a countable poset S.
6.5. It is immediately seen from the proof of Theorem 3 that there exists a
monotone selection r from R with a finite range r(S). Actually, the theorem
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remains valid without the existence of minS or maxS, but then the finiteness
of r(S) can no longer be asserted. This extension is not included here because
it is useless for game-theoretic applications (there is no fixed point theorem
without completeness), while requiring a significantly longer proof.
6.6. It remains unclear whether the assumption that both X and S are
chains can be dropped or weakened in Theorem 3. From the game-theoretic
viewpoint, however, the question does not seem pressing. The existence of an
ε-Nash equilibrium in a game with increasing best responses may hold in the
absence of monotone selections as Theorem 4 and Example 4.4 demonstrate.
If the best responses are, say, decreasing, then, indeed, all existence results
in the literature need monotone selections, but they also need the strategies
effectively be scalar and each player be only affected by a scalar aggregate of
the partners/rivals’ choices.
6.7. The assumption in Theorem 4 that each Xi is a chain is strong enough
to be extremely irritating; however, I have no idea as of now how to dispense
with it.
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